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267 
NOTES 
Dissecting Revlon: Severing the 
Standard of Conduct from the 
Standard of Review in  
Post-Closing Litigation 
 
In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC and its progeny, the 
Delaware courts made clear that a fully informed, uncoerced vote by 
disinterested stockholders triggers the waste standard. In Corwin, the Delaware 
Supreme Court also indicated that Revlon was only meant to provide 
stockholders with an expedited process for obtaining a preliminary injunction 
before the closing of a transaction. However, more recent cases indicate that 
Revlon in fact does apply after the closing of a transaction. Unfortunately, the 
Delaware courts have not been given an opportunity to determine which 
standard of review should apply at this stage—enhanced scrutiny, waste, or the 
traditional business judgment rule. This Note argues that both doctrinal 
evolution and modern corporate governance developments support the 
application of the traditional business judgment rule. In practice, this means 
that the plaintiff would need to prove a breach of the duty of loyalty by showing 
bad faith. This provides an appropriate balance between accountability and 
authority—courts should not reward corporate defendants with the waste 
standard in the post-closing context where Corwin obligations have not been 
met. Applying the bad faith standard to post-closing Revlon claims where 
Corwin does not apply also reflects the typical process by which corporate 
actions are reviewed by courts: by separating the standard of conduct from the 
standard of review. Recognizing Revlon as a standard of conduct—not as a 
conflation of a standard of conduct with a particular standard of review—
highlights the doctrine’s importance in serving as a guide for corporate actors 
in the M&A context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any corporate board of directors seeking to sell the company 
should be prepared for litigation to arise out of the transaction. This is 
not surprising: substantial power rests in the hands of a few to make 
decisions that could impact millions of people and have billion-dollar 
implications. The high-stakes nature of mergers and acquisitions 
(“M&A”) can exacerbate various issues including, but not limited to, 
agency costs, information asymmetry, and collective action problems. 
Even though the amount of deal litigation has decreased in recent years 
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after a litigation epidemic in the early 2000s,1 stockholders still 
challenge two-thirds of deals in court.2  
Most companies incorporate in Delaware,3 so Delaware courts 
often bear the responsibility of sorting through this deal litigation, 
pursuing avenues to protect both stockholder and corporate interests. 
Courts sometimes hesitate to second-guess the directors’ business 
expertise,4 but they frequently do so anyway, seeking an appropriate 
balance between authority (of the board) and accountability (to the 
stockholders).5 In order to achieve this balance, Delaware courts apply 
different standards of review based on the risk that the board will not 
act in the best interests of the stockholders during the course of a 
particular transaction.6 Until the mid-1980s, Delaware courts used only 
two levels of scrutiny when reviewing board decisions: the entire 
fairness test and the business judgment rule.7 However, the assumption 
that directors fell into either an inherently interested category or a 
completely disinterested category failed to account for other situations 
where there was a reason to second-guess a board’s action that was not 
inherently suspect.8  
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. introduced “enhanced 
scrutiny” to account for these circumstances in the antitakeover 
context.9 The Delaware Supreme Court then extended the application 
of enhanced scrutiny from the antitakeover context to the sale of a 
 
 1. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.  
 2. Brandon Mordue, The Revlon Divergence: Evolution of Judicial Review of Merger 
Litigation, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 531, 533 (2018). 
 3. A Message from the Secretary of State – Jeffrey W. Bullock, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., 
https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H7VT-9326] 
(“Delaware remains the home of the vast majority of top U.S. companies, including more than two 
thirds of the Fortune 500 and 80 percent of all firms that go public.”).  
 4. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Saying Yes: Reviewing Board Decisions to Sell or Merge the 
Corporation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 438–40 (2017).  
 5. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3281, 
3305 (2013). 
 6. Shrisha Juneja, Note, Conflicted Merger Transactions: Consolidating the Standards of 
Review, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 133, 135 (2017) (explaining that a merger transaction’s 
structure will affect the standard of review that the court applies).  
 7. J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 8 (2013).  
 8. Id. 
 9. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This context is different from the Revlon context. The 
antitakeover context refers to situations where a corporation adopts strategies to protect itself 
from being acquired by another company. See id. at 949–51 (discussing a situation where the target 
company threatened to perform a discriminatory self-tender against a stockholder making a 
hostile tender offer). The Revlon context, on the other hand, refers to situations where the sale of 
a company is imminent. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986) (discussing a situation where the “board’s authorization permitting management 
to negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for 
sale”). 
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company in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., where 
directors must seek the best offer reasonably available to the 
stockholders.10 Although Revlon itself does not require directors to take 
specific actions when selling the company in order to satisfy their 
fiduciary duties,11 subsequent cases more effectively defined the 
contours of the doctrine’s scope and provided examples of actions that 
fulfill so-called Revlon duties under particular circumstances.12 Revlon 
and its progeny established a standard of conduct that continues to 
guide corporate lawyers when advising boards of actions they should 
take when selling their companies.13  
Since 2016, Delaware court decisions have cut back on the 
strength of Unocal, Revlon, and the other “Golden Age”14 corporate law 
doctrines.15 In one of the most noteworthy cases, Corwin v. KKR 
Financial Holdings LLC,16 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a 
cleansing stockholder vote17 invokes the business judgment rule instead 
 
 10. 506 A.2d at 180; see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring 
Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 331 
(2018) (“Revlon embraces the standard that the objective of the board is to obtain the best offer 
reasonably available for the shareholders.”). 
 11. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009) (criticizing the lower 
court’s “erroneous conclusion that directors must follow one of several courses of action to satisfy 
their Revlon duties”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994) 
(“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a 
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.” (emphasis omitted)); Laster, supra note 7, at 19–20 
(“Delaware courts have clarified that Revlon does not impose specific conduct requirements.”).  
 12. See, e.g., Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243 (providing the board with three options to confirm that 
they obtained the best price available under Revlon); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 
1279, 1286, 1288 (Del. 1989) (holding that there is “no single blueprint that a board must follow” 
to adhere to Revlon duties, and in the absence of an active market test, it must be clear that the 
directors had “sufficient knowledge of relevant markets” to evaluate the transaction). 
 13. Delaware courts have provided lawyers with forty years of Revlon jurisprudence to use 
when advising their clients. See, e.g., Series of Avoidable Missteps by an Activist Stockholder and 
the Target Board Led the Court of Chancery to Find Fiduciary Breaches and Stockholder Aiding 
and Abetting in Connection with the Sale of a Company—PLX Technology, FRIED FRANK (Nov. 9, 
2018), https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FFMAPEPLXTech110918.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J28W-4UXL]; J. Anthony Terrell, Revlon in Review, PILLSBURY (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/1/0/104200.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HFW-6T4J]. 
 14. The “Golden Age” of corporate law refers to four decisions in the 1980s that put Delaware 
courts in the international spotlight by not only defining the owner-manager relationship, but also 
by establishing the obligations of owners and managers in recurring deal contexts. See Cox & 
Thomas, supra note 10, at 324–25 (“From inception each of the cases was rightly viewed as creating 
vigorous fiduciary responsibilities for directors and officers to act in the best interests of their 
company’s shareholders.”). These four decisions are Revlon, Unocal, Weinberger, and Blasius. Id.  
 15. See id. at 325–26 (“[C]entral to the judicial constrictions of [these cases] is the obeisance 
the Delaware Supreme Court repeatedly accorded to what it believes are the natural disciplining 
forces of informed shareholder consent and competitive markets for corporate control.”). 
 16. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 17. A cleansing stockholder vote is “a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested 
stockholders.” Id. at 309; see infra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
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of enhanced scrutiny.18 Subsequent cases clarified that the version of 
the business judgment rule that applies is the waste standard.19 
Therefore, the waste standard applies unless the plaintiff can prove 
that the stockholder vote was not (1) fully informed; (2) uncoerced; or 
(3) made by disinterested stockholders.20 Over three years later, Corwin 
remains highly controversial and receives substantial criticism for 
restricting Revlon’s scope and playing a significant role in the decline of 
Delaware deal litigation.21 On the other hand, some argue that Corwin 
incentivizes adherence to corporate formalities and accountability to 
the stockholders,22 which expunges conflict-of-interest concerns. This 
Note does not discuss whether Corwin was correctly or incorrectly 
decided, however. Regardless of that inquiry, the result of the decision 
was a severe restriction on the scope of Revlon.23  
In Corwin and a few subsequent cases, Delaware courts seemed 
to make clear that Revlon was only intended to provide stockholders 
with an expedited process for obtaining a preliminary injunction before 
the closing of a transaction.24 In other words, courts did not intend for 
Revlon to apply post-closing. This understanding of Revlon persisted 
until recently, when a few decisions indicated that Revlon does in fact 
apply post-closing.25 These recent cases, however, did not provide 
 
 18. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308–09.  
 19. See infra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.  
 21. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Cracking the Corwin Conundrum and Other Mysteries 
Regarding Shareholder Approval of Mergers and Acquisitions 32–38 (Sept. 19, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252264 [https://perma.cc/9F4S-7KVU] (expressing 
skepticism that a fully informed shareholder vote expunges the conflict-of-interest concerns 
because the narrow, binary decision to sell or not sell ignores the possibility that the board could 
have pursued a better deal). For example, Gevurtz states that “[f]or defendant directors, Corwin 
has become a veritable wishing well, whose magic they invoke to shield them in litigation arising 
out of corporate mergers and sales.” Id. at 2 (citing Robert S. Reder, Delaware Court Refuses to 
Invoke Corwin to “Cleanse” Alleged Director Misconduct Despite Shareholder Vote Approving 
Merger, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 200 (2017)).  
 22. See Mordue, supra note 2, at 575–76 (explaining that the Corwin doctrine should 
incentivize directors to provide greater disclosure to the stockholders and hold clean votes).  
 23. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 326 (explaining that Delaware courts have 
“substantially muted” the “Golden Quartet”: Revlon, Weinberger, Unocal, and Blasius); Joel Edan 
Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful Stockholder 
Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 645 (2017) (“Before Corwin, recovering 
significant monetary relief in post-closing litigation was considered the highest object of plaintiffs’ 
counsel in stockholder class action litigation. After Corwin, there is no clear path to do so.”).  
 24. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015) (“Revlon [is] 
primarily designed to give stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to 
address important M & A decisions in real time, before closing.”); In re Solera Holdings, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., No. 11524-CB, 2017 WL 57839, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017).  
 25. See Kahn v. Stern, No. 393, 2018 WL 1341719, at *1 (Del. Mar. 15, 2018) (“To the 
extent . . . the Court of Chancery’s decision suggests [that plaintiffs must] plead facts 
suggesting . . . a majority of the board committed a non-exculpated breach of its fiduciary duties 
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Delaware courts with an opportunity to formulate the appropriate 
analysis for claims where the board fails to satisfy its obligations under 
Corwin. In particular, none of the cases required the courts to decide 
whether enhanced scrutiny or the traditional business judgment rule26 
applies as the standard of review.27  
The standard of review in corporate litigation, as in other areas 
of law, often determines the outcome of the case.28 In corporate law, 
however, the standard of conduct and the standard of review uniquely 
diverge.29 The standard of review refers to the degree to which the court 
will scrutinize the party’s actions, whereas the standard of conduct 
defines the actions that individuals must take in a given situation.30 
This Note argues that since the standards typically diverge in corporate 
law to successfully balance authority with accountability, the 
traditional business judgment rule—not enhanced scrutiny or the 
waste standard—should apply in post-closing litigation brought against 
 
in cases where Revlon duties are applicable, but the transaction has closed and the plaintiff seeks 
post-closing damages, we disagree . . . .”); van der Fluit v. Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 
5953514, at *11–12, *11 n.159 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017).  
 26. The courts could have determined that one of two versions of the business judgment rule 
applied: the traditional business judgment rule—which in the Revlon context allows the plaintiffs 
to prove the breach of the duty of loyalty under the bad faith standard—or the waste standard. See 
infra Section II.B.3. 
 27. See Kahn, 2018 WL 1341719, at *1 (“We affirm this decision on the grounds that the Court 
of Chancery properly found that the pled facts did not support a rational inference that any of the 
directors faced a non-exculpated claim for breach of fiduciary duty . . . . [A]nd the transaction at 
issue resulted from a thorough market check and was to a buyer without any prior ties to 
management.”); van der Fluit, 2017 WL 5953514, at *11 n.159 (“I conclude that Plaintiff fails to 
state claims under either enhanced scrutiny or the business judgment rule.”); see also Edward B. 
Micheletti & Bonnie W. David, Key Developments in Delaware Corporation Law in 2017, SKADDEN 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/01/2018-insights/key-
developments-in-delaware-corporation-law [https://perma.cc/Q9Z8-GK9V] (“It remains to be seen 
whether in 2018, the Delaware courts will offer further clarity on whether enhanced scrutiny 
under Revlon or Unocal remains a viable post-closing theory in deal litigations seeking money 
damages.”).  
 28. Mordue, supra note 2, at 534 (quoting Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law 
Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 155 (2015)); Amanda 
Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 
234 (describing standards of review as “the essential language of appeals” and the “keystone to 
court of appeals decision-making” (quoting STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW ix (3d ed. 1999); then quoting MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. 
DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 493 (2005))); see also Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“The relevant standards of review are critical to the outcome of this case.”).  
 29. William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 868 (2001). 
 30. Id. at 867–68.  
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a board of directors31 that failed to satisfy its Corwin obligations.32 In 
practice, this would require the plaintiffs to prove either waste or a 
breach of the duty of loyalty by showing bad faith.33 Part I provides an 
introduction to enhanced scrutiny and describes the shift from 
understanding Revlon as a purely pre-closing action to both a pre- and 
post-closing action. Part II analyzes arguments for applying enhanced 
scrutiny or the business judgment rule to post-closing Revlon claims 
where the directors failed to satisfy their obligations under Corwin. 
Part III argues that traditional business judgment deference should 
apply in the absence of a cleansing stockholder vote in post-closing 
litigation because weak conflict-of-interest concerns call for greater 
deference to the board’s expertise in order to balance accountability 
with authority. For purposes of clarity, I will refer to post-closing Revlon 
claims where Corwin does not apply as “non-Corwin post-closing 
claims.”34 
Revlon commentary often conflates the standard of review with 
the standard of conduct.35 But this contradicts the norm in corporate 
law where the two standards uniquely diverge in order to adequately 
balance accountability with authority.36 Acknowledging this distinction 
 
 31. This Note does not address litigation brought against third parties for aiding and 
abetting. The case law in this area is not clear. See In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 
9880-VCL, 2018 WL 747180, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2018) (refusing to grant a hedge fund 
summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty claims because “[d]eciding whether Corwin calls 
for applying the business judgment rule, even without a fully informed stockholder vote, would 
force a lone trial judge to attempt to harmonize arguably conflicting language in Delaware 
Supreme Court precedents spanning decades”). Four years ago, a defendant before the Delaware 
Supreme Court argued that enhanced scrutiny should not apply post-closing, but the court avoided 
making this determination by holding that regardless of the standard of review, the actions by the 
defendants fell outside the range of reasonableness under Revlon. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. 
Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 857 (Del. 2015) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred 
in finding a due care violation without gross negligence because “the individual defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in conduct that fell outside the range of 
reasonableness, and that this was a sufficient predicate for its finding of aiding and abetting 
liability”). 
 32. Corwin does not apply in the absence of a fully informed, uncoerced vote by disinterested 
stockholders. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). 
 33. See infra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.  
 34. I include “post-closing” as part of the phrase to avoid confusion with pre-closing Revlon 
claims, which are technically non-Corwin claims as well because a cleansing vote likely has not 
occurred pre-closing. Additionally, the characterization of these claims as “post-closing Revlon 
claims” is inadequate because all post-closing claims in this context apply Revlon as the standard 
of conduct, regardless of whether Corwin applies. Thus, consistent use of the language “non-
Corwin post-closing claims” seeks to avoid any confusion that would otherwise result from 
occasional variations in phrasing. 
 35. See infra Section I.B. 
 36. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666–67 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Delaware corporate 
law distinguishes between the standard of conduct and the standard of review . . . . The numerous 
policy justifications for this divergence largely parallel the well-understood rationales for the 
business judgment rule.”); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3289 (“[J]udicial hesitation to second-guess 
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in post-closing claims not only conforms to typical judicial analysis in 
corporate litigation but also counters the extreme, yet very popular 
assertion that Revlon is dead.37 Even if a lower standard of review than 
enhanced scrutiny applies, Revlon still serves an essential role by 
establishing a standard of conduct—making it very much alive.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF REVLON AND ITS PROGENY 
Before 1985, Delaware courts applied one of two levels of 
scrutiny when reviewing board decisions: the entire fairness test or the 
business judgment rule.38 The entire fairness test applies to self-dealing 
transactions, where controlling shareholders or directors receive a 
benefit not shared equally with the remaining shareholders.39 In these 
situations, the controlling shareholders or directors have the burden of 
proving that the deal was entirely fair by showing fair dealing and fair 
price.40 This plaintiff-friendly standard protects the accountability of 
the directors in an interested transaction but does so at the expense of 
efficiency and risk-taking.41  
The business judgment rule, on the other hand, essentially 
requires courts to defer to the board’s decision unless “there is a 
 
board merger decisions . . . reflect[s] an appropriate balance between the competing claims of 
authority and accountability.”).  
 37. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After 
QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 
1595 (1994) (arguing that Revlon duties “no longer exist[ ] under Delaware law”); Lyman Johnson 
& Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 219 (2014) (“The Revlon 
doctrine . . . seems to retain unusually robust rhetorical force; but it actually has been drained of 
genuine remedial clout.”); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 163, 172 (2008) (asserting that Revlon “has become nearly a dead letter”). 
 38. Laster, supra note 7, at 8.  
 39. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (applying the entire fairness 
test to a majority shareholder squeeze out). Now, however, courts review controlling shareholder 
freezeout mergers under the business judgment rule “where the merger is conditioned ab initio 
upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills 
its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.” Kahn 
v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014); see also Ann M. Lipton, After Corwin: 
Down the Controlling Shareholder Rabbit Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 101, 121–23 (2019) (explaining 
that the difficulties in determining whether a stockholder is “controlling” further creates 
uncertainty about whether the directors must satisfy Corwin’s cleansing obligations or MFW’s 
additional sanitizing requirements to invoke the business judgment rule).   
 40. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (holding that the directors failed to satisfy their burden 
of entire fairness in a majority shareholder squeeze out when interlocking board members failed 
to disclose information to members of the other board). This is not a bifurcated test between fair 
dealing and fair price: “All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is 
one of entire fairness.” Id. 
 41. See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1181 (Del. 
2015) (“The stringency of after-the-fact entire fairness review by the court intentionally puts 
strong pressure on the interested party and its affiliates to deal fairly before-the-fact when 
negotiating an interested transaction.”). 
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showing of gross and palpable overreaching.”42 Unlike the entire 
fairness standard, this defendant-friendly review promotes efficient 
decisionmaking and often necessary risk-taking at the expense of the 
board’s accountability to the stockholders.43 These two levels of scrutiny 
adequately cover the two opposite ends of the standard of review 
spectrum, but over time, Delaware courts recognized that an 
intermediate level of scrutiny would more appropriately resolve issues 
that fall somewhere in the middle. This Part describes the evolution of 
this intermediate standard of review: enhanced scrutiny. 
A. The Rise of Enhanced Scrutiny 
The Delaware Supreme Court created enhanced scrutiny as an 
intermediate standard of review in Unocal.44 In Unocal, Mesa 
Petroleum, a minority shareholder owning 13% of Unocal’s shares, 
began a two-tiered, front-loaded tender offer45 to take over the 
company.46 Mesa sought to purchase an additional 37% in a front-end 
cash offer47 for $54 per share and the remaining shares in a back-end 
 
 42. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the business judgment rule presumes “that in making 
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 
142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928) (noting that it is not the judiciary’s “function to resolve for 
corporations questions of policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass upon 
such questions and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final.”); 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that the lower court 
properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint that alleged that the board of directors acted in bad 
faith by refusing to schedule night games at Wrigley Field). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361–62 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(“It is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to 
second guess a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases where a transaction may be so egregious on 
its face that the board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment.’ ” (quoting Aronson, 
473 A.2d at 815)).  
 44. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 45. This tactic involves one offer to take over one hundred percent of the target corporation 
through a two-step process. First, the offeror normally uses cash to secure some of the target’s 
shares before completing the second step, where the offeror acquires the remaining shares for 
securities worth less than the cash paid in the first step. Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender 
Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition 
Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 389 (1982). This is a very attractive option for acquirers because 
normally it is less expensive than a single-step partial tender offer and it incentivizes shareholders 
from the target company to tender their stock as soon as possible before the first-step deal expires. 
Id. 
 46. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.  
 47. The front-end offer of a two-tiered tender offer is normally the better of the two offers, 
because a hostile bidder wants to coerce shareholders to sell their shares. Even if the shareholders 
believe that their shares are worth more, the first offer will still coerce them to sell because it is 
better than the second offer. For example, “[i]n such offers, a shark announces in advance that he 
will buy 50% of a company’s shares in a tender offer for say, $40/share and will follow that up with 
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offer48 of $54 per share in junk bonds.49 In order to prevent this,50 
Unocal threatened to perform a discriminatory self-tender where it 
would buy back all outstanding shares (except for those owned by Mesa) 
if Mesa were to pursue the front-loaded offer.51 Despite the enormous 
cost that this scorched-earth tactic52 would levy against the company 
and its stockholders,53 the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held 
that the board could employ the discriminatory self-tender because 
Mesa’s offer posed a threat to the corporation and the defensive 
measure was reasonable in relation to the threat.54  
In reaching this conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court 
observed that takeover disputes should require a standard of review 
that falls in between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness 
test.55 On the one hand, just like any other board responsibility that is 
ordinarily reviewed under the business judgment rule, takeover bids 
 
a freezeout merger for say, $30/share.” Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender 
Offers and the “Nancy Reagan Defense”: May Target Boards “Just Say No”? Should They Be 
Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 440–41 (1990). In this situation, the target shareholders will 
sell for $40 per share even if they believe they may be worth $50 or $55 per share in order to avoid 
the second deal, which would leave them worse off. Id. at 441.  
 48. The back-end offer, normally worse than the first, occurs after shareholders quickly take 
advantage of the first offer. See supra note 47.  
 49. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949–50.  
 50. The board attended a nine-and-a-half-hour meeting where they were informed by 
investment banks that the offer was grossly inadequate. Id. at 950. According to the valuations, 
Unocal’s stock was worth in excess of $60 per share. Id.  
 51. Id. at 950–51.  
 52. A scorched earth defense is “[t]he attempt of a takeover target to make itself look 
undesirable by threatening to liquidate or destroy assets in the event of a hostile takeover.” 
Scorched Earth Defenses, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), 
https://thelawdictionary.org/scorched-earth-defenses/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/LHA6-HUN6]. 
 53. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950 (“The cost of such a proposal would cause the company to incur 
$6.1–$6.5 billion of additional debt . . . .”). After this case, the SEC banned the discriminatory self-
tender defensive measure. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules All-Holders and Best-Price, 
Exchange Act Release No. 23421, 36 SEC Docket 96 (July 11, 1986) (amending regulations to 
require tender offers to be “open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the 
tender offer”); Nathaniel C. Nash, Exclusionary Tender Offers Banned, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1986), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/09/business/exclusionary-tender-offers-banned.html 
[https://perma.cc/SU3J-YS9X] (“After more than three hours of debate, the five-member 
commission voted to outlaw so-called exclusionary tender offers and adopted a rule that requires 
anyone seeking to take over a company to make the same price available to all holders of the same 
class of stock.”).  
 54. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958–59. The court explained that the board made a reasonable 
investigation that the value of the company was more than $54 per share and that the junk bonds 
were worth significantly less than $54 per share. Id. at 955–56. The offer was deemed coercive 
because the two-tiered offer incentivized shareholders to sell in the first tier so they would not be 
left with junk bonds offered in the back-loaded offer. Id. at 956. Additionally, the court pointed out 
that “the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national reputation as a ‘greenmailer.’ ” 
Id.  
 55. Id. at 954–55.  
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require directors to decide whether the action would be in the best 
interests of the stockholders.56 On the other hand, the court noted that 
a higher standard of review must apply when analyzing takeover 
measures because of the “omnipresent specter that a board may be 
acting primarily in its own interests.”57 Thus, the court established 
enhanced scrutiny: if the board can show that it reasonably believed 
that it faced a takeover threat and the defense was reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed, the business judgment rule applies.58 If the 
board fails this two-part analysis, however, the entire fairness test 
applies.  
The Delaware Supreme Court then extended the application of 
enhanced scrutiny to situations involving the board’s decision to sell the 
company.59 In Revlon, Pantry Pride planned a hostile takeover of 
Revlon after its friendly acquisition offer was rejected by Revlon’s 
chairman of the board and CEO.60 In response, the Revlon board 
adopted defensive measures, including a stock repurchase of ten million 
shares in exchange for high-interest notes and a primitive poison pill61 
that would trigger when anyone acquired beneficial ownership of at 
least 20% of the company’s shares.62 The board later decided to 
negotiate with other potential buyers and eventually found a white 
 
 56. Id. at 954. 
 57. Id. at 954–55. Ideally, the interests of the stockholders and the directors are the same, 
but in practice, a tender offer could “spell drastically altered career paths for many top executives.” 
Leslie Wayne, Self-Interest and Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 1981), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/03/business/self-interest-and-takeovers.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5Q9-8FUQ]. For example, a chief executive may be relegated to serving as the 
head of a single division post-takeover, and even without a pay cut, she would lose significant 
power in the overall corporate scheme in terms of giving orders. Id.; see also David T. Merrett & 
Keith A. Houghton, Takeovers and Corporate Governance: Whose Interests Do Directors Serve?, 35 
ABACUS 223, 223–24 (1999) (examining internal records of board meetings to get a sense of the 
directors’ motivations during takeover negotiations).  
 58. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953, 955.  
 59. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180–81 (Del. 
1986).  
 60. Id. at 176.  
 61. A poison pill is a “takeover prevention strategy that makes stock look bad to the interested 
buyer.” Poison Pill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/poison-
pill/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/294Y-DNE8]. The more primitive version of the 
poison pill is called a flip-over trigger in contrast to the more modern flip-in trigger. In this case, 
if Pantry Pride purchased at least 20% of Revlon’s shares, then the shareholders had the right to 
be bought out by the corporation at a substantial premium. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. This would 
give the Revlon board the opportunity to buy back a majority of the shares, thus preventing Pantry 
Pride from taking over the company. Id. This defense is costly from both companies’ perspectives, 
which is likely the reason why the poison pill has only been triggered once. See Mark D. Gerstein 
et al., Lessons from the First Triggering of a Modern Poison Pill: Selectica, Inc. v. Versata 
Enterprises, Inc., LATHAM & WATKINS 1–2 (Mar. 2009), https://www.lw.com/upload/ 
pubContent/_pdf/pub2563_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTE4-FVEL] (analyzing the implications of 
“swallow[ing] a modern poison pill”).  
 62. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.  
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knight,63 Forstmann Little.64 The two parties agreed to a leveraged 
buyout for $57.25 per share provided that Revlon agree to a lock-up 
provision,65 a no-shop provision,66 and a $25 million cancellation fee.67 
Pantry Pride responded by increasing its bid to $58 per share before 
filing a claim in the Court of Chancery for a preliminary injunction.68  
As in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court applied enhanced 
scrutiny because the transaction raised “the omnipresent specter that 
a board may be acting primarily in its own interests.”69 The court 
upheld Revlon’s initial takeover measures, the stock repurchase, and 
the poison pill under the Unocal test because the defensive measures 
were held to be reasonable in relation to Pantry Pride’s takeover threat, 
which was deemed a “grossly inadequate” bid.70 However, once the 
Revlon directors agreed to look for other bidders while Pantry Pride 
continued to increase its offer price, “it became apparent to all that the 
break-up of the company was inevitable.”71 According to the court, this 
meant that the “duty of the board had thus changed from the 
preservation of Revlon . . . to the maximization of the company’s 
 
 63. A white knight is a “friendly company who takes over control.” White Knight, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/white-knight/ (last visited Jan. 1, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/YZ8G-F4Q7]. It is not terribly surprising that Revlon actively sought other 
investors. During the 1980s, Ronald O. Perelman, the chairman of the board and CEO of Pantry 
Pride, had a reputation as a fierce corporate raider and was deemed a “shareholder-unfriendly 
anti-Warren Buffet.” Andrew Bary, The Upside of Swimming with a Shark, BARRON’S (June 22, 
2013), https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB50001424052748704311204578557971330719586 
[https://perma.cc/8GHS-ZUXF]. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that Revlon’s chairman and 
CEO, Michel C. Bergerac, felt “strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman.” Revlon, 506 A.2d at 
176.  
 64. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.  
 65. A lock-up provision is “[w]hen a company allows a white knight to purchase its most 
valuable assets to prevent a hostile takeover.” Lock-Up Option, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/lock-up-option/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/ZB5J-YWU3]. 
 66. A no-shop provision is an “agreement clause between an owner and a prospective buyer 
to suspend all other purchase negotiations for a stated time period. In other words, the seller 
agrees to stop seeking other acquisition proposals.” No-Shop Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d 
ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/no-shop-clause/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/3DRG-6RHN]. 
 67. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178–79. The cancellation fee required Revlon to pay Forstmann $25 
million if it did not proceed with the transaction. Id. at 175. 
 68. Id. at 179.  
 69. Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)); 
see Juneja, supra note 6, at 140 (explaining that Revlon furthered enhanced scrutiny after Unocal 
by recognizing that conflicts of interest can exist “not only when the board is in complete control 
of the corporation but also during the period of the corporation’s final sale”).  
 70. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176–77, 180–81 (explaining that the Revlon board was informed by 
their investment banker at a meeting that “$45 per share was a grossly inadequate price for the 
company”).  
 71. Id. at 182.  
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value . . . for the stockholders’ benefit.”72 Although lock-up provisions, 
no-shop provisions, and cancellation fees are not per se impermissible 
defensive measures, they were impermissible under these particular 
circumstances because they impeded the active auction process.73 As a 
result, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors breached 
their fiduciary duties by “allow[ing] considerations other than the 
maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment . . . to the 
ultimate detriment of its shareholders.”74 
Revlon stands for the proposition that when a company is up for 
sale, its board must seek the best offer reasonably available for the 
stockholders.75 Under Revlon, the board can trigger the business 
judgment rule by proving that its decisionmaking process was adequate 
and its decision was reasonable.76 Interestingly, even though the court 
applied enhanced scrutiny in both Revlon and Unocal to protect 
stockholders from “the omnipresent specter” of director self-interest,77 
the focus of Revlon seems to diverge from that of Unocal to some extent. 
Revlon’s deeper investigation into the board’s decisionmaking process 
suggests a greater concern with the board’s execution of its duty of care 
than in Unocal, where the duty of loyalty was the principal focus.78 
Revlon’s goal—to protect against conflicts of interest and duty of care 
violations—is achieved by requiring directors to fulfill so-called Revlon 
duties,79 which are simply specific applications of the board’s 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 183–84.  
 74. Id. at 185. 
 75. Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 331.  
 76. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–85.  
 77. See id. at 180; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).  
 78. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (“No such defensive measure can be sustained when it represents 
a breach of the directors’ fundamental duty of care.” (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
874 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Grantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 
2009))); see Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55 (expressing concern with the motivations of the board 
diverging from shareholders during a takeover); Mohsen Manesh, Defined by Dictum: The 
Geography of Revlon-Land in Cash and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2014) (“ ‘Revlon [duties] . . . do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty.’ 
Instead, Revlon implicates both of these fiduciary duties.” (quoting In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995))). This became even more evident when the Delaware 
Supreme Court weakened the second step of the Unocal test by prohibiting draconian defenses 
(those that are preclusive or coercive) but allowing all other actions to be reviewed under QVC’s 
“range of reasonableness” standard. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 
1995) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994)) 
(remanding the case to allow the Court of Chancery to determine whether the target company’s 
repurchase program was a draconian defensive measure, and if not, whether it fell within the 
“range of reasonableness”).  
 79. See Laster, supra note 7, at 10 (“Revlon’s prominent language . . . seemed to contemplate 
affirmative duties for the selling board, including a potential duty to auction.”); Manesh, supra 
note 78, at 26–27 (“[Revlon] is not just about potential conflicts of interests between boards and 
shareholders. It is also about ensuring that directors act in an ‘informed and deliberate manner’ 
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“traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in the context of control 
transactions.”80 Even though Delaware courts find that “certain fact 
patterns demand certain responses,”81 “there is no single blueprint that 
a board must follow to fulfill its duties.”82  
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision left Revlon’s scope and 
application largely undecided. However, subsequent cases established 
that Revlon applies in at least three different scenarios:  
(1) “[W]hen a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to 
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company;” (2) “where, 
in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an 
alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company”; or (3) when approval of a 
transaction results in a “sale or change of control.”83  
Although a few cases muddled the confines of the doctrine’s 
scope,84 Revlon and its progeny established a standard of conduct that 
goes into effect when a change of control becomes inevitable.85 
 
with respect to significant and irreversible end-of-the-line transactions.” (quoting Ivanhoe 
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987))).  
 80. In re Alloy, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5626-VCP, 2011 WL 4863716, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 
2011); see McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The fact that a 
corporate board has decided to engage in a change of control transaction invoking so-called Revlon 
duties does not change the showing of culpability a plaintiff must make in order to hold the 
directors liable for monetary damages.”).  
 81. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989). 
 82. Id.; see QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 45 (“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny 
should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”); 
Laster, supra note 7, at 19–20 (explaining that Revlon does not impose specific conduct 
requirements but rather calls on courts to determine the reasonableness of the conduct). 
 83. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994); Bainbridge, 
supra note 5, at 3314 (quoting id.).  
 84. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 37, at 175–76 (noting that this uncertainty stems from 
a failure to clearly identify the rationales for a heightened level of scrutiny and why certain 
transactions do or do not fall under the Revlon doctrine); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog 
Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise 
Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 246 (2012) (explaining that uncertainty 
surrounding Revlon’s application “continues to feed into the risk-aversion of directors and 
corporate managers as they contemplate acquisitions”); see also Alexandros N. Rokas, Reliance on 
Experts from a Corporate Law Perspective, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 323, 344–45 (2013) (explaining 
that Revlon’s impact on the reliance doctrine is unclear).   
 85. See Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-Decreasing 
Scope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 528–34 (1999) (explaining how corporate lawyers 
should counsel boards on fulfilling process-oriented Revlon duties); Megan Wischmeier Shaner, 
How “Bad Law, Bad Economics and Bad Policy” Positively Shaped Corporate Behavior, 47 AKRON 
L. REV. 753, 791–92 (2014) (“Prior decisions such as Revlon and Unocal led to significant changes 
in thinking with respect to the types of deal protection devices a target board could agree to as well 
as the flexibility of a target board in agreeing and responding to proposals containing strong deal 
protection devices.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Counseling the Board of Directors of a Delaware 
Corporation in Distress, 2008 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 60–61 (discussing the importance of the 
standards of review established in Delaware case law, including Revlon, in determining how to 
best advise corporations in distress).   
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B. Revlon as an Exclusively Pre-Closing Claim 
An epidemic of deal litigation in the 2000s led Delaware courts 
to significantly restrict Revlon’s application just as they were beginning 
to clarify its scope.86 In 2005, stockholders challenged approximately 
39% of M&A transactions over $100 million, whereas in 2011, they 
challenged approximately 92% of these transactions.87 Many class 
action lawyers abused the higher standard of review established in 
Unocal and Revlon by filing weak claims that were less likely to be 
dismissed in the early stages of litigation under enhanced scrutiny than 
under the business judgment rule.88 All claims—meritorious and 
frivolous alike—incentivized defendants to settle because it protected 
the transaction and avoided high discovery and litigation costs.89 
Settling was also a cheaper alternative for corporations because it did 
not require them to indemnify directors,90 who, in the absence of 
director and officer liability insurance,91 would otherwise remain fully 
exposed to monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care92 and the 
 
 86. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 375–80. 
 87. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015); see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 
10, at 375 (explaining that between 1999 and 2013, the percentage of deals that were litigated 
increased from 10% to 96%). 
 88. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 375–76 (noting that three-quarters of the deals that 
were litigated in 2013 resulted in settlements and “over three-quarters of those settlements were 
disclosure-only settlements”); Friedlander, supra note 23, at 629 (“Counsel for stockholder 
plaintiffs were able to file suits indiscriminately and settle them, knowing that . . . enhanced 
judicial scrutiny of certain forms of transactions made the cases hard to dismiss.”). 
 89. See Ryan Lewis, Comment, What Happens in Delaware Need Not Stay in Delaware: How 
Trulia Can Strengthen Private Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 2017 BYU L. REV. 715, 
729 (explaining that when plaintiffs bring these types of claims, “corporate mechanics will 
incentivize defendants to settle quickly, even if the claim has no underlying merit . . .”). Settlement 
also allows the corporation to “facilitate a securities offering, merger, large transaction, [or] other 
deal timeline.” Id. 
 90. They would still have to indemnify the directors for expenses, however. See Bennett L. 
Ross, Note, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 
VAND. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987) (“When a suit is brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation, 
directors and officers cannot be indemnified for judgments or amounts paid in settlement, but can 
be indemnified only for expenses.”). 
 91.   Many corporations have director and officer (“D&O”) liability insurance, which can protect 
directors even in situations where they cannot be indemnified. Jun Sun Park, A Comparative 
Study of D&O Liability Insurance in the U.S. and South Korea: Protecting Directors and Officers 
from Securities Litigation, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10–11 (2010). However, some 
policies can contain exclusions for conduct related to takeover activities. Ross, supra note 90, at 
77–78. 
 92. The duty of care is a “legal requirement . . . where the board of directors and executives 
must make informed decisions in discharging their fiduciary responsibilities.” Duty of Care, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/duty-of-care/ (last visited Jan. 
1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z67P-WV7K]. 
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duty of loyalty93 prior to the effective date of the director exculpation 
statute.94 While class actions significantly benefitted plaintiffs’ lawyers 
through attorneys’ fees, they provided little benefit to the stockholders 
themselves and created concerns that deal litigation was not being 
driven by the merits.95  
As a result, the Delaware Court of Chancery increased the 
standard for evaluating disclosure-only settlements96 in In re Trulia, 
Inc. Stockholder Litigation.97 In response to shareholder lawsuits,98 
defendant corporations and directors would obtain settlements that 
provided sweeping releases from liability in exchange for additional 
disclosures in the proxy statement and attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs’ 
 
 93. The duty of loyalty is a “legal requirement . . . where the board of directors and executives 
must ensure that any action taken is done in good faith and with the best interests of shareholders 
in mind.” Duty of Loyalty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), 
https://thelawdictionary.org/duty-of-loyalty/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/65ZP-
9HFE]. 
 94. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 37, at 205–06 (explaining that the value-maximization 
objective of Revlon included duty of care liability since the director exculpation statute, 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporations Law, did not become effective until July 1, 
1986). The statute allows for corporations to include a provision in their corporate charters that 
eliminates directors’ liability for breach of the duty of care. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on 
Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate 
Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 380–81 (1988) (referring to the Delaware director exculpation 
statute as the “opt out statute”); Carl Samuel Bjerre, Note, Evaluating the New Director 
Exculpation Statutes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 786, 786 (1988) (explaining that other states have 
followed Delaware’s lead in allowing such charter provisions, which has created a “race for the 
bottom” to create hospitable legal environments to entice corporate leadership to incorporate in 
their respective states (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974))).  
 95. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(characterizing deal litigation as an accumulation of strike suits that “are designed to end—and 
very quickly too—in a settlement in which class counsel receive fees and the shareholders receive 
additional disclosures concerning the proposed transaction”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 376 
(“Fear that such litigation is not driven by merits, but rather by the quest for a quick settlement, 
is fed by a study finding no correlation between the premium shareholders receive as a 
consequence of the merger and the likelihood of there being a fiduciary class action claim.” (citing 
Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits 
Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 836, 876–77 (2014))); Friedlander, supra note 23, at 623 (describing 
the widely held recognition that stockholder class actions challenging mergers are often not 
productive).  
 96. Disclosure-only settlements were “the most common form of settlement” in shareholder 
class action suits before Trulia. Jason Klig, Disclosure-Only Settlements and the Case for In re 
Trulia, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 689–90 (2018).  
 97. 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 98. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, “class actions and, in particular, acquisition-related 
class actions appear[ed] to have become ‘the dominant form of corporate litigation, outnumbering 
derivative suits by a wide margin.’ ” Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free 
Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1800 
(2004) (quoting Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135 (2004)).  
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lawyers.99 Delaware courts, as well as other state courts,100 worried that 
these releases were overly broad because they barred all stockholders 
from bringing future litigation related to the transaction unless they 
affirmatively opted out.101 Since corporations often face litigation 
related to a transaction regardless of the precautions they take, the fact 
that they could obtain such broad releases through disclosure-only 
settlements actually incentivized them to withhold complete disclosure 
at the beginning of the transaction.102 In response to these concerns, the 
Trulia court announced that it would exercise greater vigilance in 
analyzing the reasonableness of disclosure-only settlements by 
requiring the plaintiff to show plainly material disclosures or 
omissions.103 In the opinion, the Court of Chancery heavily relied on 
studies demonstrating that greater disclosure to stockholders has very 
little impact on stockholder voting.104 As a result, “[t]he flood of 
 
 99. Lewis, supra note 89, at 729–30; see Peter J. Walsh, Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Delaware 
Insider: Trulia and the Demise of “Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb. 
2016, at 1–2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/02/delaware-
insider-201602.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ5J-JS6S] (describing the history of 
disclosure-only settlements in Delaware). Disclosure-only settlements were often seen as an 
opportunity for “attorneys to make a quick buck.” Klig, supra note 96, at 695. 
 100. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 896; Klig, supra note 96, at 695.  
 101. Klig, supra note 96, at 694–95. Standard releases covered “all possible claims, known or 
unknown, asserted or un-asserted, arising out of or relating to the events that were the subject of 
the litigation.” Id. at 694 (quoting Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 385 
(Del. Ch. 2010)). In shareholder class actions, “[m]any shareholders are not incentivized to both 
determine whether it is in their best interest to opt out of a class and then take the affirmative 
step to opt out because they do not have large enough interests.” Id. at 695. 
 102. Id. at 697. Attorneys advised corporate clients to withhold certain information because 
they would inevitably face litigation regardless of the amount of disclosure they provided, and then 
they could obtain a broad release from liability through a disclosure-only settlement later. Id. at 
697–98. 
 103. Id. at 898–99. The Court of Chancery explained the implications of the new standard: 
[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with 
continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly 
material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed release 
is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and 
fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that such claims 
have been investigated sufficiently. 
Id. at 898. 
 104. See id. at 895 n.29–30 (citing Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement 
in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 
(2015)).  
Clemmons_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:31 AM 
284 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:267 
disclosure-only cases quickly dropped to more manageable levels”105 
and alleviated the pressure to settle meritless disclosure-only claims.106  
Even before Trulia, Delaware courts limited stockholders’ 
ability to obtain pre-closing relief under Revlon in C & J Energy 
Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation 
Employees’ Retirement Trust (“C & J Energy”).107 The Court of Chancery 
and the Delaware Supreme Court had two starkly different 
interpretations of the facts,108 but the Delaware Supreme Court 
ultimately held that Revlon is not an affirmative obligation on the board 
to seek the highest bidder.109 In reaching the decision, the court also 
strongly discouraged granting injunctions in the absence of a competing 
bidder,110 especially because the stockholders are “capable of addressing 
[the] harm themselves by the simple act of casting a ‘no’ vote.”111 An 
injunction would be appropriate in three scenarios:  
(1) [W]here plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood of success on their claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and there is a ‘rival bidder’ attempting to buy the company;  
(2) where there are disclosure violations and the stockholders are not adequately 
informed; and (3) where the stockholders “will be coerced into accepting the transaction 
if they do not find it favorable.”112  
 
 105. Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 325–26. Although disclosure-only litigation dropped in 
Delaware state court, there is significant evidence that this caused plaintiffs to flock to the federal 
courts. Id. at 378; see also Lewis, supra note 89 (arguing for a uniform application of Trulia’s 
“plainly material” standard to reduce abusive securities-based class actions).  
 106. Courts not only hated disclosure-only settlements because they often pressured 
defendants to settle meritless cases, but also because the settlements often included releases from 
future claims not addressed in the complaint. See James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature 
of Corporate Norms Can Prevent Their Destruction By Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 509–10 
(2016).  
 107. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).  
 108. See Mordue, supra note 2, at 545. The Court of Chancery took the view that the company 
set out to acquire another company and ended up selling itself instead. Id. Since the corporation 
had an exculpatory provision for the duty of care that barred post-closing damages, the Court of 
Chancery issued a preliminary injunction to stop the deal. Id. at 548. However, the Delaware 
Supreme Court viewed the situation as a strategic decision “with contractual protections for the 
seller and a price supported by a passive market check.” Id. at 545–46. 
 109. C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1067–71. This is despite the fact that Revlon’s language seems 
to suggest that this is an affirmative obligation. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“The directors’ role changed from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale 
of the company.”).  
 110. C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1073: 
[W]here no rival bidder has emerged to complain that it was not given a fair opportunity 
to bid, and where there is no reason to believe that stockholders are not adequately 
informed or will be coerced into accepting the transaction . . . the Court of Chancery 
should be reluctant to take the decision out of their hands. 
 111. Id. at 1072.  
 112. Mordue, supra note 2, at 553–54 (footnotes omitted) (quoting C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 
1073).  
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Although the court acknowledged that “an after-the-fact 
monetary damages case is an imperfect tool,” it decided that ordering 
an injunction under the circumstances was improper.113 Therefore,  
C & J Energy clearly limited stockholders’ ability to obtain pre-closing 
injunctive relief, but the court’s reference to post-closing damages as an 
“imperfect tool” suggested that shareholders could still recover post-
closing damages under Revlon.114  
After C & J Energy, however, the Delaware Supreme Court not 
only severely restricted the application of enhanced scrutiny, but also 
seemed to prevent stockholders from recovering post-closing damages 
under Revlon. In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,115 
stockholders challenged a stock-for-stock merger after it was approved 
through a stockholder vote.116 Affirming the Court of Chancery, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that “when a transaction not subject to 
the entire fairness standard is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced 
vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule 
applies.”117 The court further explained that “Unocal and Revlon are 
primarily designed to give stockholders and the Court of Chancery the 
tool of injunctive relief to address important M & A decisions in real 
time, before closing.”118 Delaware courts subsequently clarified that the 
version of the business judgment rule that applies after a cleansing vote 
is the waste standard,119 which requires the plaintiff to show that the 
defendants authorized a transaction that was “so one sided that no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”120 Although 
 
 113. C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1073. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  
 116. Id. at 306–08. Note that it is uncertain whether this transaction actually triggered 
Revlon. Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 8. First, it is not clear whether the same corporate law doctrines 
in this context apply to LLCs. Id. Second, “[t]he merger was an equity exchange involving two 
publicly traded entities—albeit, a general partner, rather than an elected board, controlled the 
limited partnership.” Id. 
 117. Id. at 308–09.  
 118. Id. at 312 (“They were not tools designed with post-closing money damages claims in 
mind, the standards they articulate do not match the gross negligence standard for director due 
care liability under Van Gorkom, and with the prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions, due 
care liability is rarely even available.”). 
 119. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (“When the business judgment 
rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result . . . because 
it has been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is 
wasteful.”); van der Fluit v. Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 
2017) (“Where the business judgment rule applies pursuant to Corwin, claims are dismissed 
absent a showing of waste.”).  
 120. E.g., Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012) 
(quoting In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009)). The 
waste standard is nearly impossible to show. See, e.g., id. at *6 (“A plaintiff, as here, alleging waste 
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directors’ actions do not always satisfy Corwin,121 traditional Revlon 
claims where Corwin does not apply arise rather infrequently.122 As a 
result, Corwin insulates almost all of the board’s decisions when selling 
the company, as long as the directors produce an untainted, cleansing 
vote.123  
While seeming to entirely foreclose Revlon’s applicability post-
closing, the court’s language in Corwin appears to conflate Revlon’s 
standard of review (enhanced scrutiny) with the standard of conduct 
(the board’s actions). The Delaware Supreme Court used both Revlon 
and Unocal to justify the elimination of Revlon’s applicability post-
closing,124 but Unocal does not even apply in this context—it applies 
only when the board uses antitakeover defenses. This suggests that the 
underlying reason for preventing Revlon from applying post-closing is 
the standard of review: enhanced scrutiny. The court’s language 
therefore demonstrates an understanding of the Revlon doctrine that is 
contrary to that of most corporate law doctrines, where the standard of 
conduct and the standard of review diverge.125 As a result, the court 
essentially eliminated the standard of conduct it must analyze under 
the applicable standard of review. And unfortunately, the conflation of 
Revlon’s standard of review and standard of conduct was not limited to 
Corwin. As recently as 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed 
a non-Corwin post-closing claim, stating that Revlon “was not a tool 
‘designed with post-closing damages claims in mind.’ ”126 
 
arising from the decision of an independent board concerning employee compensation has set 
himself a Herculean, and perhaps Sisyphean, task.”). 
 121. See van der Fluit, 2017 WL 5953514, at *7–8 (determining that Corwin did not apply 
when the board failed to disclose that key representatives involved in transaction negotiations 
would receive post-deal employment benefits because the stockholders were not fully informed); 
In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 
2017) (declining to apply Corwin when the proxy issued in connection with the transaction 
contained material omissions); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-
VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (holding that Corwin does not apply where the 
challenged conduct occurred well before the merger). 
 122. See Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 2 (“For defendant directors, Corwin has become a veritable 
wishing well, whose magic they invoke to shield them in litigation arising out of corporate mergers 
and sales.”); Zachary A. Paiva, Note, Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach of Duty of Disclosure 
Claims Following “Cash-Out” Mergers in Delaware, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 339, 354 (2017) 
(“While not insurmountable, Corwin’s cleansing remains a serious hurdle for plaintiffs . . . .”). 
 123. See Mordue, supra note 2, at 575.   
 124. See Corwin, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015). 
 125. See infra notes 143–146 and accompanying text.  
 126. In re Solera Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11524-CB, 2017 WL 57839, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 5, 2017) (quoting Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312); see Robert S. Reder & Tiffany M. Burba, 
Delaware Courts Confront Question Whether “Cleansing Effect” of Corwin Applies to Duty of 
Loyalty Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 187, 189–93 (2017). 
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C. Revlon as a Post-Closing Claim 
Despite that these cases limited Revlon’s applicability to the pre-
closing context, more recent Delaware court decisions have applied the 
doctrine post-closing. In van der Fluit v. Yates, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery analyzed a non-Corwin post-closing claim under Revlon even 
though prior Delaware jurisprudence rejected this practice.127 In a two-
step merger transaction between Opower and Oracle,128 Opower’s 
disclosure materials neglected to inform the stockholders that two of 
the company’s negotiators received “post-transaction employment and 
the conversion of unvested Opower options into unvested Oracle 
options.”129 Although the stockholders approved the transaction, van 
der Fluit—a stockholder for Opower—filed a lawsuit four months later 
alleging that the stockholders were not fully informed because the 
Schedule 14D-9 failed to disclose material information130 and the 
directors failed to fulfill their duties under Revlon.131  
First, the Court of Chancery held that Corwin did not apply 
because Opower failed to fully inform the stockholders that certain 
fiduciaries had self-interests that were arguably in conflict with 
shareholder interests.132 Even though the court recognized that Corwin 
“might be read to suggest that Revlon does not apply at this stage of 
litigation,” it still analyzed the post-closing claim under Revlon.133 The 
Vice Chancellor explained, “I need not decide the standard of review, 
because I conclude that Plaintiff fails to state claims under either 
enhanced scrutiny or the business judgment rule.”134 The court 
 
 127. van der Fluit v. Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017).  
 128. Before van der Fluit, the Delaware courts extended the holding in Corwin to the first step 
of two-step mergers. See In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 747 (Del. Ch. 2016), 
aff’d, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017).  
 129. van der Fluit, 2017 WL 5953514, at *8.  
 130. “ ‘An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding’ whether to approve the challenged 
transaction.” Id. at *7 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985)). 
 131. Id. at *1–4.  
 132. Id. at *8. In an attempt to invoke the entire fairness standard, the plaintiff also raised 
two arguments that Laskey and Yates were controlling stockholders, but the court rejected both. 
Id. at *5–7. To constitute a controlling stockholder, the individual or group of individuals must (1) 
own greater than 50% of the voting power or (2) exercise control over the business affairs of the 
corporation. Id. at *5. However, Laskey and Yates only owned 30% of the stock and the two 
agreements that they signed (a tender agreement and an investor rights agreement) did not render 
them a control group because neither included binding agreements related to voting or 
decisionmaking. Id. at *6–7; see Robert S. Reder & Elizabeth F. Shore, Chancery Court Holds that 
Defendant Directors’ Failure to Disclose Material Facts Defeated Application of Corwin, But 
Nevertheless Dismisses Claims Against Directors Due to Plaintiff’s Failure to Adequately Plead 
Directorial Breach of Their Duty of Loyalty, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 41, 45–47 (2018).  
 133. van der Fluit, 2017 WL 5953514, at *11–12, *11 n.159.  
 134. Id. at *11 n.159.  
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dismissed the case for failure to state nonexculpated claims against the 
board,135 but the fact that the court analyzed the claim at all left open 
the possibility that stockholders could obtain post-closing relief under 
Revlon.  
After van der Fluit, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that 
Revlon applies post-closing. In Kahn v. Stern,136 the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the stockholders’ 
claim for breach of the duty of loyalty against the directors.137 It pointed 
out, however, that the Court of Chancery’s reasoning in dismissing the 
suit was not entirely sound. According to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs 
are not limited to pleading that the directors breached only 
nonexculpated fiduciary duties “in cases where Revlon duties are 
applicable, but the transaction has closed and the plaintiff seeks post-
closing damages.”138 The Supreme Court’s disagreement with the Court 
of Chancery on this requirement conveys two important points. First, 
the court clarified that an exculpatory charter provision, which 
insulates directors from duty of care liability, does not provide a blanket 
exception from performing Revlon duties.139 Second, the more general 
reference to Revlon’s applicability post-closing illustrates that damages 
relief against individual directors for breaches of traditional Revlon 
duties is an available avenue for stockholders to recover in deal 
litigation.140  
In sum, van der Fluit and Kahn affirm that courts will review 
non-Corwin post-closing claims under Revlon. Neither case, however, 
presented the Delaware courts with an opportunity to decide which 
standard of review applies, because both claims were too weak to 
survive motions to dismiss even under the business judgment rule.  
 
 135. The court held that the target company sought the highest value reasonably available 
after describing the company’s detailed process used to seek a high value and the target company’s 
ability to negotiate a 30%–51% premium for the shareholders. Id. at *11–12.  
 136. No. 393, 2018 WL 1341719 (Del. Mar. 15, 2018).  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *1 & nn.3–4; see Robert S. Reder & Victoria L. Romvary, Delaware Supreme Court 
Clarifies Pleading Standard in Post-Closing Damages Action Alleging Breach of “Revlon” Duties, 
72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29, 37 (2018). The two footnotes provided in this sentence of the court’s 
short opinion provide more context. The first footnote states that an exculpatory charter provision 
does not mean that Revlon is inapplicable, but rather that Revlon “remains applicable as a context-
specific articulation of the directors’ duties but directors may only be held liable for a non-
exculpated breach of their Revlon duties.” Kahn, 2018 WL 1351719, at *1 n.3. The second footnote 
cites two prominent Revlon cases. Id. at *1 n.4 (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); then citing In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 
2005)).  
 139. See id. at *1 & n.3. 
 140. See Reder & Romvary, supra note 138, at 37–38.  
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II. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUTHORITY USING ENHANCED 
SCRUTINY AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE  
The standard of review often drives the outcome of litigation.141 
One element that distinguishes corporate law from other practice areas, 
however, is the relationship between the standard of review and the 
standard of conduct.142 In many areas of the law, an individual’s 
required conduct under a given set of circumstances often conflates with 
the court’s test to review the conduct.143 For example, in a tort case 
involving a car accident, the standard of conduct and the standard of 
review both evaluate whether the person drove carefully.144 In corporate 
law, however, the two standards diverge because the courts must 
attempt to support efficient decisionmaking while also resolving agency 
costs.145 Another way to characterize this balancing is one between 
authority and accountability.146  
In accordance with the typical separation of the standard of 
conduct from the standard of review in corporate law, the standard of 
conduct for all post-closing Revlon claims—both where Corwin applies 
and where it does not—requires the board to adhere to its traditional 
Revlon duties by taking actions that satisfy the applicable standard of 
review. Where Corwin applies, the applicable standard of review is 
waste,147 so the remaining question is which standard of review applies 
to non-Corwin post-closing claims: Enhanced scrutiny or a form of the 
business judgment rule? On one hand, enhanced scrutiny may produce 
more uniformity and predictability than applying another standard 
since it already applies to pre-closing Revlon claims. On the other hand, 
given the rise of independent directors, the business judgment rule may 
 
 141. See supra note 28.  
 142. Allen et al., supra note 29, at 868.  
 143. See id.; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporation Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38 (1993).  
 144. Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 437. Another example is agency law: the standard of 
conduct governs the agent as he acts on behalf of the principal and the standard of review is based 
on whether the agent acted fairly in his dealings with others. Id. 
 145. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666–67 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“The numerous 
policy justifications for this divergence largely parallel the well-understood rationales for the 
business judgment rule.”); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3289. The two standards would be identical 
in corporate law only in a perfect world “in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for 
assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the 
role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ.” Eisenberg, 
supra note 143, at 437–38. Additionally, many corporate law scholars “believe that the 
fundamental concern of corporate law is ‘agency costs.’ ” Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3289 (quoting 
Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 295 (1998)). 
 146. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3281, 3290 (noting, however, that complete reconciliation of 
these two interests is impossible).  
 147. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  
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provide the proper deference to the board’s authority in the absence of 
concerns with conflicts of interest. The appropriate standard of review 
for post-closing deal litigation should provide the best balance between 
authority and accountability.   
A. Arguments for Enhanced Scrutiny 
Enhanced scrutiny requires the directors to show that they 
“act[ed] reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best value 
reasonably available to the stockholders.”148 When the board sells the 
company, the concern is that the directors may not act in the best 
interests of the stockholders, so applying a lower standard of review 
may fail to adequately protect stockholder interests and upset the 
equilibrium between accountability and authority. Enhanced scrutiny 
thus appropriately balances the two by providing a more rigorous 
analysis of the directors’ accountability. This Section explains the 
arguments for the application of enhanced scrutiny in non-Corwin post-
closing claims from a modern corporate governance perspective and 
from a doctrinal standpoint. 
1. Corporate Governance Perspective 
  The nature of modern corporate governance, which is shaped by 
recent developments in the corporate world and natural human 
responses, may justify the application of enhanced scrutiny.  
One recent corporate development that may call for greater 
scrutiny is the rise of hedge fund activism. Hedge fund activism, which 
refers to hedge funds’ actions to take “an aggressive investment interest 
in the stock . . . of a public company and seek[ ] to make returns by 
influencing the corporation to change its capital structure or business 
plan,”149 began in the early 2000s and has led to a significant increase 
in M&A activity.150 Although not all hedge fund targets can be neatly 
placed into one category,151 often they are companies with lagging 
performance where hedge funds can make improvements to increase 
 
 148. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).  
 149. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective on 
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1886 
(2017). The fact that hedge funds can be “activists” is a bit of an oxymoron itself since hedge funds 
were originally meant to temper, or “hedge” risk. Id. at 1885–86.  
 150. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a 
World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 39–40 (2016).  
 151. See Strine, supra note 149, at 1889. 
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value and short-term profits.152 Since hedge funds face strong 
incentives to increase the company’s value so they can sell the stock for 
a higher price,153 they often pursue board positions to enhance the 
company’s corporate governance.154 Hedge funds’ powerful influence 
also indirectly affects the actions of other corporations, which adopt 
strategies to make themselves less attractive targets for hedge funds.155  
Hedge fund activism creates potential conflicts of interest in the 
M&A context that may justify enhanced scrutiny. One of these potential 
conflicts is the concept of “short-termism.”156 While hedge funds focus 
on making profits as quickly as possible before selling the stock,157 most 
remaining stockholders, who lack the financial resources to compete 
with hedge funds for decisionmaking power, seek long-term gains.158 
The concern is that hedge funds will make important corporate 
decisions, including those in the M&A context, to serve their own short-
term interests, even when doing so will detriment the long-term 
interests of the remaining stockholders.159 Hedge funds may also hold 
board positions160 or yield strong voting power in two corporations 
seeking to merge with each other,161 which presents another 
opportunity for hedge funds to exert strong influence in merger 
decisions to serve their own interests without taking into account those 
of other stockholders. Although hedge funds initially invest in 
corporations to improve corporate governance, the perhaps unintended 
consequence of creating conflicts of interest may support the application 
of enhanced scrutiny.  
 
 152. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1664 (2013).   
 153. See Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors’ Independence at Controlled 
Companies, 44 J. CORP. L. 103, 128 (2018).  
 154. Cox & Thomas, supra note 150, at 23–24; Strine, supra note 149, at 1872. 
 155. See Strine, supra note 149, at 1934. Although this seems to serve as a negative effect at 
first glance, remember that hedge funds seek to develop struggling or undervalued companies to 
make profits. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 1664 (“[A]ctivists target companies whose operating 
performance lags behind peers, and that their interventions are followed by consistent and long-
term improvements in operating performance.”); Strine, supra note 149, at 1890–91 (noting that 
modern target companies are profitable, but are undervalued as they “pay out less profits than the 
industry average”). Thus, company efforts to deter hedge funds from influencing their own 
corporation likely have indirect positive effects. 
 156. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 
BUS. LAW. 977, 985–87 (2013).  
 157. Strine, supra note 149, at 1892. 
 158. Id. at 1876–85.  
 159. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083–84 (2007); Roe, supra note 156, at 985.  
 160. See Strine, supra note 149, at 1962 (discussing the debate about whether activist hedge 
funds should owe fiduciary duties to their targets). 
 161. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 159, at 1073–75 (discussing hedge fund conflicts in merger 
votes). 
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Natural human behavior also plays a role in shaping modern 
corporate governance. The high-stakes nature of mergers and 
acquisitions can cause deviations from common behavioral norms that 
may warrant stricter review of board decisions.162 The decision to sell a 
corporation sparks “a range of human motivations, including but by no 
means limited to greed,”163 and thus opens the door to potential abuse 
by the board. These transactions present opportunities for a variety of 
improper behaviors, including self-dealing, that may be rationalized by 
cognitive biases.164 Given the significant financial implications and 
human consequences of these transactions, there is a high risk that the 
board will not act in the best interests of the stockholders. Delaware 
courts have long recognized the danger of favoritism, but enhanced 
scrutiny could effectively mitigate its consequences.  
2. Doctrinal Perspective 
From a doctrinal perspective, applying enhanced scrutiny post-
closing would create greater consistency between pre- and post-closing 
analyses, especially given that the same concerns with conflicts of 
interest exist regardless of when the lawsuit is filed. 
Concerns about conflicts of interest are not somehow expunged 
just because the stockholders brought the claim after, not before, 
closing. The court is less worried that the board acted contrary to the 
interests of the stockholders where Corwin applies because the 
stockholders approved the transaction through a fair, cleansing vote. In 
a non-Corwin post-closing claim, however, the board denied the 
stockholders a fair opportunity to approve the transaction because the 
vote was not fully informed, coerced, or made by interested 
stockholders. Without a fair vote, the risk that the board acted contrary 
to the interests of the stockholders has not been mitigated. Since 
conflicts of interest exist in both pre-closing Revlon claims and non-
Corwin post-closing claims, there is a strong argument that enhanced 
scrutiny should apply in both situations.      
In addition, applying the same standard of review for pre-closing 
Revlon claims and non-Corwin post-closing claims may provide 
consistency and uniformity.165 Reviewing board actions under varying 
 
 162. See Laster, supra note 7, at 17.  
 163. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012).   
 164. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988); 
Laster, supra note 7, at 17 (“These include familiar cognitive biases such as overconfidence, 
excessive optimism, groupthink, reactive devaluation, and in-group/out-group thinking.”).  
 165. See Laster, supra note 7, at 53–54 (stating that the existence of varying standards of 
review leads to an unnecessary waste of time and expense litigating about which standard of 
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standards of review merely based on the timing of the lawsuit may yield 
inconsistent outcomes related to whether the board acted in accordance 
with its Revlon duties.166 In other words, applying a different standard 
of review to non-Corwin post-closing claims may produce a doctrinal 
split. Some board actions may satisfy Revlon duties under one standard 
of review but not the other—even though neither situation involves an 
untainted, cleansing vote. The timing of the lawsuit would serve as the 
only basis for creating this split, which is a weak justification because, 
as discussed, the timing of the lawsuit has no bearing on the level of 
risk of conflicts of interest. Adopting a uniform standard of review for 
both pre-closing Revlon claims and non-Corwin post-closing claims 
preserves predictability and avoids complicating the Revlon doctrine 
any further.   
One might push back on this argument by suggesting that 
Delaware courts have already created a doctrinal split with the decision 
in Corwin.167 For instance, the board’s actions may be sufficient to 
satisfy the waste standard under Corwin but not enhanced scrutiny. 
However, this so-called split results from the presence or non-presence 
of an intervening action that mitigates the risk that would otherwise 
justify a higher standard of review.168 In this way, Corwin does not 
really produce a doctrinal split because the cleansing vote adequately 
addresses the risk of conflicts of interest.169 In non-Corwin post-closing 
claims, this risk is not reduced since the board failed to obtain a 
cleansing vote. Therefore, applying different standards of review where 
the risks of conflicts of interest are the same undermines the very 
justification for applying enhanced scrutiny in the first place.170  
One disadvantage of applying a higher standard of review in 
many legal contexts is that it may invite excessive and frivolous 
litigation. Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant invites 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to file weak claims and pressure defendants to 
settle.171 This behavior generates fear that litigation is not being driven 
 
review should apply); Juneja, supra note 6, at 134–35, 153 (arguing that the consolidation of the 
standards of review for all conflicted merger transactions would provide uniformity and efficiency). 
 166. See Laster, supra note 7, at 53–54.  
 167. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  
 168. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). 
 169. See id. But see supra note 21. 
 170. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those 
of the corporations and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial 
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be 
conferred.”).  
 171. See Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining 
Frivolous Appeals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 271 (2009) 
(“The applicable standard of review can play a role in a finding of frivolity by setting the threshold 
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by the merits, which plagued the Delaware courts during the deal 
litigation epidemic of the early 2000s.172  
Applying enhanced scrutiny to non-Corwin post-closing claims, 
however, would not have this effect today. Delaware courts have 
already crafted barriers to prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits that 
may otherwise result from applying a higher standard of review. Trulia 
and Corwin provided the two principal barriers against frivolous 
lawsuits. Trulia deincentivizes plaintiffs’ attorneys from filing frivolous 
lawsuits because even if claims are strong enough to withstand pretrial 
challenges, the courts will approve disclosure-only settlements173 only 
where the plaintiff can prove plainly material disclosures or 
omissions.174 Facing a higher risk that a weak claim will fail to satisfy 
the “plainly material” standard, lawyers are unlikely to expend their 
own resources to bring questionable claims. Corwin plays a significant 
role in curbing frivolous litigation by allowing corporations to replace 
enhanced scrutiny with a fully informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested 
stockholders.175 Invoking a lower standard of review and shifting the 
burden to the plaintiffs results in more dismissals of frivolous claims in 
the early stages of litigation.176 Since the holdings in Trulia and Corwin 
curbed abuse by plaintiffs’ attorneys during an earlier era of excessive 
deal litigation,177 these barriers will prevent frivolous post-closing 
claims even if a higher standard of review applies.178 Therefore, 
 
over which a successful appellant must pass.”); see also Brian W. LaCorte, Supreme Court Rulings 
Expected to Curb Meritless Patent Litigation, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2014-04-30-supreme-court-rulings-
expected-to-curb-meritless-patent-litigation.aspx [https://perma.cc/UJV4-6BE4] (discussing two 
Supreme Court patent cases that shifted standards of review in order to “curb meritless ‘patent 
troll’ litigation”).  
 172. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 375–76. 
 173. Disclosure-only settlements became a common method for “quickly resolving stockholder 
lawsuits that [were] filed routinely in response to the announcement of virtually every transaction 
involving the acquisition of a public corporation.” In re Trulia Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887 
(Del. Ch. 2016). In these settlements, the plaintiff stockholders agree to drop the lawsuit provided 
that the defendant supplement the proxy materials that were already given to the stockholders 
before they voted on a particular transaction. Id. As a result of the settlement, the stockholders do 
not get any economic benefit and the only money that changes hands is the attorneys’ fees for 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Id.  
 174. See id. at 898 (explaining that “plainly material” means that “it should not be a close call 
that the supplemental information is material”).  
 175. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). 
 176. See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through 
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2010) (explaining that 
when shareholders have the burden of proving breach of fiduciary duty, “the defendants usually 
win early dismissal of the litigation”).  
 177. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 10, at 375–80. 
 178. However, this may not necessarily prevent plaintiffs from filing lawsuits in other 
jurisdictions. See id. at 326 (noting that after Trulia, there was evidence of flight to federal courts); 
Mordue, supra note 2, at 589 (“It is unclear how much of that outflow represents an attempt to 
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enhanced scrutiny could serve as a stronger check on the directors’ 
accountability without causing a flood of litigation.  
B. Arguments for the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule, the default standard of review in 
corporate law,179 defers to the directors’ business expertise unless the 
plaintiff can prove that the directors did not act “on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”180 From an institutional standpoint, this 
deference seems reasonable because directors possess more business 
expertise than judges do, which makes them better equipped to 
evaluate business decisions.181 As a result, courts leave decisionmaking 
power in the hands of experts and support the board’s authority in the 
absence of conflict-of-interest concerns. This Section explains the 
arguments for the application of business judgment deference in non-
Corwin post-closing claims from a modern corporate governance 
perspective and from a doctrinal standpoint. 
1. Corporate Governance Perspective 
Although some developments in corporate governance, such as 
hedge fund activism, create potential conflict-of-interest concerns, other 
developments in the M&A context mitigate such concerns. When 
Delaware courts introduced enhanced scrutiny in the 1980s, most 
corporate boards consisted of a majority of interested directors, 
including the firm’s senior officers or outsiders with deep connections to 
the firm.182 Such board compositions are no longer the norm, 
however.183 Filling boards with independent directors was first deemed 
a mere voluntary “good governance” decision, but today, reducing 
 
avoid Corwin versus an attempt to avoid Trulia and continue bringing meritless disclosure 
litigation in the hopes of a settlement.”). For example, “[o]f the deals completed in 2016, only 34% 
were challenged in Delaware, while 61% were challenged in other states and 39% in federal court.” 
Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 608 (2018). 
 179. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004). 
 180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
 181. See Bainbridge, supra note 179, at 117–24.  
 182. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007) (explaining that 
before the 2000s, most believed that “as a normative and positive matter . . . boards should consist 
of the firm’s senior officers, some outsiders with deep connections with the firm . . . and a few 
directors who were nominally independent but handpicked by the CEO”). 
 183. See id. 
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agency costs with independent directors is practically mandatory.184 For 
example, companies listed on major stock exchanges must have 
majority-independent boards to list their shares185 and public 
companies must have an audit committee composed solely of 
independent directors to comply with post-Enron legislation.186 
Although many aspects of corporate governance have remained 
unchanged over the years, independent directors have become 
increasingly mandatory in the modern business world.   
The rise of independent directors naturally decreases the risk of 
conflicts of interest. Although the Revlon court did not clearly explain 
why enhanced scrutiny applied,187 most scholars agree that the court’s 
concern with the omnipresent specter of director self-interest is at least 
a major contributing, if not the decisive, factor in both the Unocal and 
Revlon decisions.188 An independent board mitigates accountability 
concerns because it “enhance[s] the fidelity of managers to stockholder 
objectives, as opposed to managerial interests or stakeholder 
interests.”189 The prominence of independent directors thus diminishes 
the very justification for enhanced scrutiny’s original foundation. As a 
result, applying enhanced scrutiny may overprotect stockholder 
interests, which compromises efficient decisionmaking. For this reason, 
the business judgment rule may serve as a better alternative to 
preserve this balance.  
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Mordue, supra note 2, at 553; see NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (“Listed 
companies must have a majority of independent directors.”); Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(b)(1) (“A 
majority of the board of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors.”); see also Howard 
B. Dicker et al., Requirements for Public Company Boards, WEIL, GOTSHAL, & MANGES LLP 2–4 
(Mar. 2015), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/150154_pcag_board_requirements_chart_ 
2015_v21.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX3C-4N3W] (explaining the independent board requirement 
under the NYSE and Nasdaq as well as the definitions of “independent director” under 
requirements for both stock exchanges).   
 186. See Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(i) (2019) 
(“Each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board of directors of the listed 
issuer, and must otherwise be independent . . . .”); NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.06; 
Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(c)(2); Gordon, supra note 182, at 1468. 
 187. See Manesh, supra note 78, at 25–27 (“[T]here seems to be no one single policy or principle 
that animates Revlon and its progeny.”). 
 188. See Laster, supra note 7, at 54–55 (explaining that even though the court’s rationale for 
applying enhanced scrutiny in Revlon was unclear from the opinion, Delaware decisions 
consistently recognize the omnipresent specter as the principal justification).  
 189. Gordon, supra note 182, at 1469. Independent directors resolve other issues in the United 
States as well that include “enhanc[ing] the reliability of the firm’s public disclosure” and 
“provid[ing] a mechanism that binds the responsiveness of firms to stock market signals but in a 
bounded way.” Id. 
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2. Doctrinal Perspective 
From a doctrinal standpoint, reviewing claims for post-closing 
damages under business judgment deference would perhaps create the 
most practical outcome when considering the role of the courts in M&A 
litigation.  
One of the justice system’s roles in M&A litigation is to 
determine the proper relief. In pre-closing actions, courts can provide 
quick injunctive relief to ensure that directors act informatively with 
respect to irreversible transactions.190 However, once a transaction 
closes, courts can no longer provide injunctive relief to block the 
transaction. In fact, a post-closing challenge to a merger may occur 
years after closing.191 Since the court cannot “unscramble the eggs” once 
a transaction closes, the stockholders’ only form of relief is damages.  
Given that directors are generally only liable for damages after 
the transaction closes, the business judgment rule safeguards necessary 
risk-taking by the board.192 Before closing, a stockholder vote likely has 
not occurred, so a cleansing vote under Corwin cannot substitute for 
enhanced scrutiny in a pre-closing action.193 After closing, a stockholder 
vote has occurred, so a cleansing vote can substitute for enhanced 
scrutiny as long as it is untainted—meaning that it is made by fully 
informed, uncoerced, and disinterested stockholders.194 Although non-
Corwin post-closing claims exist only if the board taints the cleansing 
vote, holding directors to a higher level of scrutiny for post-closing 
damages deincentivizes risk-taking strategies that may otherwise 
maximize stockholder interests.195 Granting deference to the board in 
this situation still holds directors accountable for damages but protects 
efficiency and encourages board participation by the most experienced 
and knowledgeable business experts. 
The business judgment rule also promotes judicial restraint, 
which may be preferable in deal litigation from an institutional 
standpoint.196 Courts are experts in the law, not in corporate 
transactions negotiated among those with substantial business 
 
 190. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09, 312 (Del. 2015); Gevurtz, 
supra note 21, at 19; Manesh, supra note 78, at 25–27 (arguing that the Revlon doctrine is meant 
to ensure that directors act informatively with respect to irreversible transactions, not just to fix 
conflict-of-interest situations). 
 191. See Mordue, supra note 2, at 588.  
 192. See Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 19. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 19. 
 196. See Gevurtz, supra note 4, at 439.  
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expertise.197 Even though the argument for deference to expertise 
applies in many legal contexts,198 it lacks vigor in the context of 
Delaware corporate law because Delaware judges possess a significant 
amount of business expertise.199 Since the extraordinary corporate 
migration to Delaware, the Delaware courts have grappled with 
thousands of complex legal issues arising out of various corporate 
transactions.200 Thus, deferring to the board solely based on their 
expertise is an unconvincing justification standing alone. But judicial 
interference in the post-closing context jeopardizes the board’s risk-
taking strategies (which are necessary to succeed in today’s competitive 
corporate world) and remains harder to justify given the rise of 
independent directors. 
3. Versions of the Business Judgment Rule 
There are two versions of the business judgment rule that could 
apply to non-Corwin post-closing claims. First, the traditional business 
judgment rule, which normally applies to non-change-in-control 
decisions, requires stockholders to prove a breach of the duty of care or 
the duty of loyalty.201 Since corporations can now essentially eliminate 
the ability of stockholders to bring duty of care claims against 
directors,202 in practice, stockholders are limited to proving a breach of 
the duty of loyalty under the bad faith standard.203 The waste standard, 
on the other hand, requires stockholders to show that the defendants 
authorized a transaction that was “so one sided that no business person 
of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has 
received adequate consideration,” which is typically an insurmountable 
burden.204 The waste standard applies, for example, in the presence of 
 
 197. See Bainbridge, supra note 179, at 117–24.  
 198. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) 
(holding that the court should defer to the agency as long as the statute is ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable); see also James J. Brennan, Note, The Supreme Court’s 
Excessive Deference to Legislative Bodies Under Eighth Amendment Sentencing Review, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 551, 574 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court exercises too much deference 
to legislative bodies in the Eighth Amendment context).  
 199. See Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 41 (“[T]he frequent merger litigation in Delaware courts 
both creates and demonstrates substantial sophistication by Delaware judges in dealing with 
mergers and acquisitions.”).   
 200. See id. (“At any event, it is also no secret that a mini industry has developed in litigation 
challenging the majority of board decisions to merge, thereby imposing what many have referred 
to as a transaction tax on mergers and acquisitions.”).  
 201. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 202. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 203. See infra notes 242–246 and accompanying text.  
 204. E.g., Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *3, *6 (Del. Ch. June 29, 
2012) (“A plaintiff, as here, alleging waste arising from the decision of an independent board 
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an untainted cleansing vote under Corwin to insulate directors from 
liability arising out of transactions that the stockholders themselves 
approved through a fair vote.205 Since both standards are versions of the 
business judgment rule, they both provide significant deference to the 
board of directors and place a heavy burden on the stockholders.  
C. Determining the Order of Analysis 
 Deciding the appropriate standard of review will also 
necessarily require determining whether the analysis of post-closing 
claims should begin with Corwin or the merits of the stockholders’ 
claims. Delaware courts have not yet determined whether to begin with 
an analysis of Corwin or of the potential breach of fiduciary duties. The 
Delaware Court of Chancery took both approaches when analyzing 
post-closing claims in the same year.206 In In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders 
Litigation, Chancellor Bouchard first held that stockholders failed to 
plead breaches of the duty of care and loyalty before deciding that 
Corwin applied (thus invoking the waste standard).207 However, less 
than a month later, in Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., Vice 
Chancellor Glasscock first decided that Corwin did not apply (because 
structural coercion tainted the stockholder vote) before analyzing the 
merits of the stockholders’ claims.208  
The order of review takes on crucial importance regardless of the 
applicable standard of review for post-closing claims. Courts should 
begin their analysis by determining whether the directors have met 
their Corwin cleansing obligations because this will determine how the 
court will review the board’s conduct. If the stockholder vote satisfies 
Corwin’s requirements, then the waste standard applies.209 If not, then 
the court would apply the appropriate standard of review for non-
Corwin post-closing claims. The only circumstance that would 
potentially render a preliminary Corwin analysis irrelevant would be if 
the waste standard applied in non-Corwin post-closing claims because 
applying the same standard of review—regardless of whether the 
directors held an untainted, cleansing vote—would effectively render 
Corwin useless by failing to incentivize a cleansing vote. Assuming that 
 
concerning employee compensation has set himself a Herculean, and perhaps Sisyphean, task.”); 
see also supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.  
 205. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *15–
24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017); In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 11027-CB, 2017 WL 1956955, 
at *8–17 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2017). 
 207. 2017 WL 1956955, at *8–17.  
 208. Sciabacucchi, 2017 WL 2352152, at *15–24. 
 209. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
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standards of review do in fact determine the outcome of the case, it 
seems proper to determine which standard of review applies by 
analyzing Corwin before examining the directors’ conduct.210  
III. SOLUTION: EVALUATING BOARD ACTIONS IN NON-CORWIN POST-
CLOSING CLAIMS UNDER THE TRADITIONAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
AND REVLON’S STANDARD OF CONDUCT  
The traditional business judgment rule—not enhanced scrutiny 
or the waste standard—should apply when reviewing non-Corwin post-
closing claims because deference protects the board’s authority in the 
absence of accountability concerns. In practice, applying the traditional 
business judgment rule would require the plaintiffs to prove a breach of 
the duty of loyalty by meeting the bad faith standard. While this is 
concededly a high burden, it is still lower than the waste standard. The 
waste standard would provide too much deference, particularly because 
there is still reason to question the transaction in the absence of a fair, 
cleansing vote. Understanding Revlon not as a conflation of enhanced 
scrutiny with the board’s actions, but as a standard of conduct, re-
establishes the divergence of the two standards that consistently recurs 
in corporate law doctrine and reinforces the importance of Revlon, even 
when enhanced scrutiny does not apply.  
A. Deference in Response to Recent Corporate 
and Legal Developments  
The business judgment rule should apply to non-Corwin post-
closing claims, as opposed to enhanced scrutiny, because recent 
business and legal developments largely extinguish the specific 
concerns that justified applying enhanced scrutiny to pre-closing 
Revlon claims. This Section argues not only that corporate governance 
developments have substantially decreased concerns that the board 
may be acting primarily in its own interest but also that applying the 
business judgment rule better reflects Delaware’s recent deferential 
positions in duty of care claims.  
1. Corporate Governance Developments Support  
Business Judgment Deference 
The rise of independent directors substantially minimizes the 
threat of the “omnipresent specter” of director self-interest that 
 
 210. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
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concerned the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal and Revlon.211 The 
percentage of independent directors serving on boards has increased 
over the past ten years, and more than three-quarters of S&P 500 
boards have put additional limits on their directors’ ability to accept 
positions with other corporations.212 Although one may argue that the 
high financial stakes of mergers and acquisitions still raise the concern 
that independent directors will not pursue the stockholders’ best 
interests,213 this argument underestimates the directors’ expertise.214 
Most boards consist of individual directors with specialized knowledge 
in a variety of industries, and the percentage of directors with global 
professional experience increased to 32% in 2018.215 Further, lead and 
presiding directors often served in critical decisionmaking roles for 
corporations before obtaining their current positions.216 Directors’ 
extensive business experience and education diminish concerns that 
their decision to sell a company will be based solely on their own greed—
these are career professionals who have made similar decisions in high-
stakes situations before and are aware of the legal implications of 
breaching their fiduciary duties.217 Therefore, the prominence of 
director independence justifies the application of the business judgment 
rule. 
 
 211. Gordon, supra note 182, at 1468; see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).  
 212. 2018 United States Spencer Stuart Board Index, SPENCER STUART 16 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2018/october/ssbi_2018.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4MW5-2SWN] [hereinafter Spencer Stuart 2018] (“More than three-quarters of 
S&P 500 boards (77%) have established some limit on their directors’ ability to accept other 
corporate directorships, an increase from 56% in 2008.”). 
 213. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.  
 214. See Alan S. Gutterman, BUSINESS COUNSELOR’S LAW AND COMPLIANCE PRACTICE 
MANUAL § 14:9 (2014) (“Realizing the practical and public relations advantages of recruiting board 
members who are well-versed in financial reporting and accounting issues, companies have 
adopted policies with respect to director qualifications that emphasize the need to find candidates 
with education and experience.”). 
 215. Spencer Stuart 2018, supra note 212, at 12–14. This was an increase from 29% in 2017. 
2017 United States Spencer Stuart Board Index, SPENCER STUART 13 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/ssbi_2017_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/33F3-TGFZ] [hereinafter Spencer Stuart 2017]. In addition, “13% of new 
independent directors were born outside the U.S., an increase from 8% in 2017.” Spencer Stuart 
2018, supra note 212, at 12.  
 216. Id. at 23 (“47% of lead/presiding directors are retired CEOs, chairs, vice chairs, presidents 
or COOs.”).  
 217. See Gutterman, supra note 214, § 14:10 (explaining that corporate directors “have a 
number of opportunities to attend educational and training programs [that] include presentations 
by outside legal experts on topics of current interest including recent court decisions interpreting 
the duties of directors of public companies”). 
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Some critics have questioned the independence of directors after 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals,218 but the principal institutional 
failure in those situations was related to gatekeepers,219 not 
independent directors.220 Even so, post-Enron legislation has increased 
the requirements for director independence.221 For example, the New 
York Stock Exchange not only requires that an independent director 
have “no material relationship with the listed company” but it also 
delves into the director’s prior employment, familial and consulting 
relationships, and charitable ties.222 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission also responded by increasing its independence standard for 
directors who serve on the audit committee under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.223 Even without considering these legal reforms, corporations have 
created innovative board structures to foster attitudes of mutual 
accountability, which promotes independence-in-fact.224 For instance, 
corporations have established committees tasked with specific 
functions that have separate legal and transactional committees and 
have adopted various means to restrain the CEO’s agenda-setting 
authority.225 Even if weak independence standards had played a small 
role in the Enron and WorldCom scandals, both legal and corporate 
institutions responded with reforms that increased the quality of 
director independence.  
The rise of hedge fund activism has also decreased concerns of 
conflicts of interest in M&A transactions overall. Even though hedge 
 
 218. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002) (explaining 
that the failure of the monitoring board was due to weaknesses of the independence of directors 
serving on specialized committees and those tasked with performing crucial monitoring functions); 
Jonathan H. Gabriel, Note, Misdirected? Potential Issues with Reliance on Independent Directors 
for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641, 649–51 (2005) (explaining that 
Enron was largely caused by the independent directors’ failure to monitor); see also Victor 
Brudney, The Independent Director – Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 
658–59 (1982) (viewing the independence of the board skeptically and doubting whether 
independent directors will effectively monitor corporations).   
 219. “Gatekeepers” here refers to “intermediaries who provide verification and certification 
services to investors.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW 1403, 1405 (2002). 
 220. Id. at 1403–05; Gordon, supra note 182, at 1539. 
 221. See Gordon, supra note 182, at 1477 (breaking down mechanisms of director 
independence into four categories: (1) tightening legal rules; (2) increasing positive and negative 
sanctions; (3) development of intra-board structures; and (4) reducing CEO influence in director 
selection).  
 222. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02; Gordon, supra note 182, at 1483.  
 223. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2019); Standards Related to Listed Company Audit 
Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8220, 79 SEC Docket 2876 (Apr. 9, 2003); Gordon, supra 
note 182, at 1483.  
 224. Gordon, supra note 182, at 1490. 
 225. Id. at 1490–1500.  
Clemmons_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:31 AM 
2020] DISSECTING REVLON 303 
fund activism does create these conflicts occasionally, hedge funds’ 
efforts to increase board accountability as a wealth-increasing strategy 
largely outweighs these concerns. Many individual stockholders are 
long-term investors,226 but all stockholders (both long-term and short-
term investors alike) desire significant liquidity, regardless of whether 
that happens in the short term or the long term.227 Even if there were a 
crucial distinction between the interests of short-term and long-term 
investors in this context, empirical studies reveal that hedge fund 
targets that experience short-term gains actually continue to enjoy 
positive effects in the long run.228 Therefore, the perception that hedge 
funds “pump and dump”229 at the expense of long-term stockholders is 
likely just a result of their business model, which requires short 
investment horizons.230 Even when a hedge fund holds financial stakes 
in two corporations seeking to merge, its ultimate goal remains the 
same: to maximize the value of its portfolio.231 This goal therefore 
mitigates the conflict-of-interest concerns because the hedge fund 
continues to serve other stockholder interests by seeking to maximize 
value.  
Additionally, hedge funds provide substantial corporate 
governance benefits that significantly outweigh the infrequent and 
unintended consequence of creating conflicts of interest. For example, 
large blockholders, such as hedge funds and other institutional 
investors, increase corporate accountability by creating concentrated 
ownership, which gives them more power and incentives to actively 
improve corporate governance than individual stockholders with small 
stakes in the corporation.232 The large financial stake that hedge funds 
have in these ventures not only reduces collective action costs in a way 
that promotes better corporate governance but also incentivizes 
managerial oversight.233 Given that hedge fund activism already acts 
 
 226. Strine, supra note 149, at 1876–85.  
 227. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism 
in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1044 (2014). 
 228. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1085, 1090–91 (2015) (finding no evidence that long-term shareholders of target companies 
experienced significant negative returns three years after the hedge fund reduced its stake below 
5%); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008). Empirical studies on hedge fund activity outside of the United States are 
consistent with these results. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 227, at 1041 n.132 (citing Dionysia 
Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 459, 479 (2013)). 
 229. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 228, at 1130–35.  
 230. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 227, at 1046.  
 231. Id. at 1044–47. 
 232. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 150, at 22–23.  
 233. See id. at 22–26. 
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as an effective market force to increase accountability to the 
stockholders ex ante, applying enhanced scrutiny ex post is 
unnecessary.234 
2. Current Legal Doctrine Supports Business Judgment Deference 
In addition to the various corporate governance developments 
that support application of the business judgment rule in this context, 
recent Delaware court decisions support use of the business judgment 
rule as well.  
Providing the board of directors with greater deference is 
consistent with the current direction that Delaware corporate law is 
heading in terms of analyzing duty of care claims. Even though Revlon’s 
original application of enhanced scrutiny investigated the board’s 
decisionmaking process to prevent “slothful indifference,”235 Delaware 
case law has since shifted away from stringent review of duty of care 
issues.236 The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom,237 which held directors personally liable for failing to carefully 
scrutinize a cash-out merger favored by the company’s CEO, propelled 
the Delaware legislature to enact section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.238 The statute permits corporations to adopt 
charter provisions that eliminate or limit the “personal liability of a 
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages” 
 
 234. See id. at 23 (explaining that hedge fund activism has served as a market check on 
corporate governance at a time when legal doctrines have barred many opportunities to challenge 
the board’s actions through class action litigation). 
 235. See Manesh, supra note 78, at 28.  
 236. See Reza Dibadj, Disclosure as Delaware’s New Frontier, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 689, 690–91 
(2019) (arguing that the duty of candor and the duty of disclosure should be the new frontier for 
corporate law because courts underprotect shareholders from breaches of the duty of care and duty 
of loyalty) (“The duty of care—watered down to a gross negligence standard by the business 
judgment rule, and further eroded by statutory exculpation clauses permitted under DGCL section 
102(b)(7)—is notoriously weak.”); Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse 
in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28 (2003) (“Today, the duty of care serves as only a very 
weak substantive constraint on director conduct and is spoken of in unusually shrunken terms.”); 
Thomas Rivers, Note, How to Be Good: The Emphasis on Corporate Directors’ Good Faith in the 
Post-Enron Era, 58 VAND. L. REV. 631, 639 (2005) (explaining that “now-common exculpatory 
provisions have tempered the practical effect of the duty of care”). 
 237. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the directors breached their duty of care in 
approving a proposed cash-out merger because their process was inadequate after the company 
CEO neglected to provide written materials or hire an investment banker for the quick 
presentation at the board meeting before approval), overruled on other grounds by Grantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009). 
 238. Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and Exculpatory 
Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307, 
310–11 (2006) (explaining that until Van Gorkom, the legal community believed that directors 
were essentially immune for breaches of the duty of care); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 464–67 (2004); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020). 
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for breaches of the duty of care.239 Unsurprisingly, almost every publicly 
traded company immediately adopted one of these provisions.240 
Allowing corporations to contract out of the duty of care demonstrates 
its dwindling importance and corporate law’s considerably stronger 
deference to the board’s authority, at least in the post-closing context. 
In light of recent developments in corporate governance and Delaware 
law, the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of review 
for analyzing non-Corwin post-closing claims.  
B. Incentivizing Adherence to Corporate Formalities 
and Fiduciary Duties 
Applying the traditional business judgment rule, as opposed to 
the waste standard, provides proper deference to the board of directors 
while also recognizing that issues tainting the stockholder vote create 
a reason to question the transaction.  
Since a tainted stockholder vote clearly does not mitigate 
concerns about the transaction (hence, the word “tainted”), the waste 
standard fails to provide stockholders with enough legal protection in 
the absence of a cleansing vote. The waste standard applies in the 
presence of a cleansing stockholder vote because otherwise, 
stockholders would be able to challenge deals that they approved 
through a fair vote.241 If the vote is tainted, however, the stockholders 
may not have voted with full knowledge of the realities of a transaction. 
A stockholder vote is considered “tainted” and renders Corwin 
inapplicable when the stockholders can show that the vote was (1) not 
fully informed; (2) coerced; or (3) made by interested stockholders.242 
Since the stockholders may not have voluntarily approved the 
transaction with full knowledge of the realities, requiring them to 
satisfy the nearly impossible burden of waste is inconsistent with the 
incentives created under Corwin. Since concerns about the transaction 
are not mitigated, the traditional business judgment rule should apply.  
Even though the waste standard does not apply, the traditional 
business judgment rule is still concededly a high burden on the 
stockholders in the Revlon context.243 In practice, stockholders are 
generally limited to proving a breach of the duty of loyalty. Duty of care 
 
 239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  
 240. Honabach, supra note 238, at 312–13.  
 241. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  
 242. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
 243. See Casey, supra note 176, at 17, 20–21; Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 
75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035, 1065 (2018) (“Today . . . it is extremely difficult to prevail on a duty 
of loyalty claim.”). 
Clemmons_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:31 AM 
306 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:267 
claims are very difficult to prove. Most corporate charters include a 
director exculpation provision that insulates directors from personal 
liability for breaches of the duty of care.244 If stockholders allege a 
breach of the duty of care in the presence of an exculpatory charter 
provision, they must satisfy the often insurmountable waste 
standard.245 Even in the absence of such a provision, they must prove 
gross negligence, which is also a high bar.246 As a result of the 
unsurprising popularity of director exculpation provisions, the 
stockholder is practically limited to proving a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, which requires a showing of bad faith.247  
While this is a high burden, it is still lower than the waste 
standard.248 Additionally, stockholders can recover damages based on 
director-by-director assessments. Delaware courts have “emphasized 
that each director has a right to be considered individually when the 
directors face claims for damages in a suit challenging board action.”249 
As a result, plaintiffs can recover damages from any one of the 
directors—they need not prove bad faith and damages across the entire 
board.  
Although the traditional business judgment rule requires the 
stockholders to prove bad faith, it provides a better balance between 
accountability and authority than enhanced scrutiny and the waste 
standard. For one, the diminished concern with the omnipresent 
specter of director self-interest fails to justify the application of 
enhanced scrutiny. However, courts should not reward directors with 
the waste standard if the stockholder vote was not entirely informed, 
uncoerced, or disinterested because this would eliminate the incentive 
to hold cleansing votes in the post-closing context.  
Since the waste standard would not apply, review of any post-
closing Revlon claim should begin with a Corwin analysis before 
 
 244. See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text.  
 245. Laster, supra note 7, at 51 (“Complaints against Revlon transactions are subject to 
dismissal on the pleadings for failure to plead facts sufficient to overcome an exculpatory charter 
provision.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  
 248. Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 
477, 507–08 (“[B]ad faith is a ‘broader’ and more ‘flexible’ theory than waste or self-dealing.”).  
 249. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1182 (Del. 2015); 
see also Ellen J. Odoner et al., Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors in Uncertain Times, WEIL, 
GOTSHAL & MANGES & COLUM. L. SCH. 9 (Aug. 2017), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/ 
2018/fiduciary-duties-of-corporate-directors-in-uncertain-times.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HQQ-
4VL9] (“The liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis because the nature 
of their breach of duty (if any), and whether they are exculpated from liability for that breach, can 
vary for each director.” (quoting In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 
2004 WL 1305745, at *38 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004))).  
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analyzing the directors’ conduct. The presence or absence of a cleansing 
stockholder vote determines the standard of review that should apply 
when reviewing the particular transaction at issue. If the quality of the 
stockholder vote is sufficient to satisfy Corwin, then courts review the 
transaction under the waste standard.250 If not, then the traditional 
business judgment rule applies. Courts need to know how closely to 
scrutinize the transaction before reviewing it because the standard of 
conduct (the board’s Revlon duties) cannot act on its own to effectively 
balance between accountability and authority.251 Thus, bypassing this 
preliminary determination again conflates the standard of review with 
the standard of conduct and jeopardizes the role that the standard of 
review plays in shaping litigation outcomes.   
C. Preserving Revlon’s Standard of Conduct  
If the traditional business judgment rule applies to non-Corwin 
post-closing claims, the board’s Revlon duties will remain the same 
because the standard of conduct does not change. Only the standard of 
review changes, so the fact that courts scrutinize the transaction 
differently does not alter the requirement that directors satisfy their 
fiduciary duties when selling a company. For example, the shift in the 
standard of review will not require directors, at the time of the 
transaction, to do more if stockholders bring the claim pre-closing 
rather than post-closing. The existence of various levels of scrutiny is 
not a response to different board actions but rather the risk created by 
the transaction that the board is not acting in the stockholders’ 
interests.  
The result of applying a different standard of review to non-
Corwin post-closing claims from pre-closing Revlon claims is that the 
timing of the lawsuit will determine which party has the burden of 
proof. In pre-closing Revlon claims where enhanced scrutiny applies, 
the defendants must prove that they sought the best offer reasonably 
available under the circumstances.252 In non-Corwin post-closing claims  
 
 
 
 250. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  
 251. See Peters, supra note 28, at 258 (explaining that the first thing that the court should 
consider is the review process and “[f]or a standard of review to work the way it was intended to 
work, however, it must be understood, applied, and used by the court to reach its decision”). 
 252. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.  
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where the traditional business judgment rule applies, the plaintiffs 
must prove breach of nonexculpated Revlon duties.253  
Although corporate law consistently separates the standard of 
conduct from the standard of review,254 scholars and courts conflate the 
two standards when discussing Revlon. In non-Corwin post-closing 
claims, requiring a showing of bad faith does not necessarily make the 
claim a non-Revlon one. Rather, the standard of conduct under 
traditional Revlon remains the same, but the application of a different 
standard of review merely shifts the burden from the defendants to the 
plaintiffs. In terms of the standard of conduct, it is still a Revlon claim; 
the standard of review just requires the plaintiffs to show more.  
CONCLUSION 
Many critics continue to assert that Revlon is no longer of 
significant importance, and some even assert that the doctrine is 
“dead.”255 However, just because enhanced scrutiny applies less 
frequently than in the past does not mean that Revlon is now irrelevant. 
When viewing Revlon as a standard of conduct independent of the 
standard of review, the doctrine still defines what is required of 
directors every single time they put corporations up for sale.  
Severing the standard of conduct from the standard of review 
allows courts to better adapt to changes in corporate governance over 
time. Instead of throwing Revlon out the window just because changed 
circumstances no longer justify the application of enhanced scrutiny, 
courts can preserve fundamental corporate law doctrines while 
reviewing them more or less rigorously, thus making them more 
adaptable over time. In the 1980s, boards consisted of mostly interested 
directors, so the omnipresent specter of director self-interest justified 
the application of enhanced scrutiny.256 The prominence of independent 
directors today, however, largely extinguishes the justification for 
applying enhanced scrutiny.257 These recent changes in modern 
corporate governance call for traditional business judgment deference 
in non-Corwin post-closing claims, but lowering the standard of review  
 
 
 253. See Kahn v. Stern, No. 393, 2018 WL 1341719, at *1 n.3 (Del. Mar. 15, 2018) (“The 
presence of an exculpatory charter provision does not mean that Revlon duties no longer apply. 
Rather, Revlon remains applicable as a context-specific articulation of the directors’ duties but 
directors may only be held liable for a non-exculpated breach of their Revlon duties.”).  
 254. See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text.  
 255. See supra note 37.  
 256. See Gordon, supra note 182, at 1468.  
 257. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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still preserves Revlon as a standard of conduct. Revlon continues to 
govern in any case involving the sale of a company, and contrary to what 
many critics believe, the doctrine is very much alive.  
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